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I.

INTRODUCTION: ALTERNATIVE VIEWS OF THE CATHEDRAL

This Article aims to contribute to the study of how the law should
allocate and protect entitlements in the presence of externalities. In
their classic article published thirty years ago, Calabresi and Melamed
studied such questions and offered what they labeled "one view of the
Cathedral."1 I seek to add to the inquiry started by Calabresi and
Melamed by offering an ex ante perspective and analyzing how alloc"!
tions of entitlements affect parties' ex ante actions and investments.
Suppose that an upstream Factory would benefit from an activity
that would pollute a river and harm an activity conducted by a down
stream Resort. In this as in many other cases, the respective rights of
the parties must be determined. Does Factory have the right to engage
in the polluting activity, or does Resort .have the right to water free of
pollution? If Resort is entitled to unpolluted water, should it be pro
tected by a property right or by a liability rule?2
Calabresi and Melamed, and the subsequent extensive literature on
the subject,3 have primarily conducted what I will label an "ex post
1. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inal
ienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). This article is widely
viewed as a seminal contribution to law economics and legal theory. See James E. Krier &
Stewart J. Schwab, The Cathedral at Twenty-Five: Citations and Impressions, 106 YALE L.J.
2121 (1997) (demonstrating the influence of the article through citation analysis); Carol M.
Rose, The Shadow ofThe Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J. 2175 (1997) ("One View of the Cathedral
is now so much a part of the legal canon that it is widely known by the joined names of its
two authors .. . . ").
2. In addition to property rights and liability rules, Calabresi and Melamed also exam
ined an additional form of protection - inalienability rules. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra
note 1, at 1 1 1 1-15. This Article will focus, however, as much of the literature has done, on
alienable rights that parties may sell or waive. For an economically oriented analysis of inal
ienability rules, see Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights,
85 COLUM. L. REV. 931 (1985).
3. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & J.M. Balkin, Legal Entitlements as Auctions: Property Rules,
Liability Rules, and Beyond, 106 YALE L.J. 703 (1996); Ian Ayres & Paul M. Goldbart, Op
timal Delegation and Decoupling in the Design of Liability Rules, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1
(2001); Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Fa
cilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027 (1995); Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zan-
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analysis." I use this term to refer to an analysis·that takes as given the
payoffs that parties would have with and without externality
producing actions. In the above example, an ex post analysis would
take as given both the presence of Factory and Resort and their poten
tial costs and benefits from their respective activities. Taking these
elements of the situation as given, the analysis would examine which
entitlement allocations would lead to the efficient level, if any, of pol
lution-producing activity on the part of Factory.
The common starting point for an ex post analysis is the Coasean
insight that, in cases in which the relevant parties can easily bargain ex
post, the allocation of entitlements will matter little in terms of effi
ciency.4 As long as parties can bargain around legal rules, the ex post
outcome will be always efficient. Given that bargaining is subject to
transaction costs and imperfect information, however, such ex post ef
ficiency cannot be guaranteed. The ex post analysis therefore exam
ines which allocation of entitlements would most likely facilitate the
efficient outcome in a world where such obstacles to bargaining exist.
This Article focuses on how ex ante decisions are affected by allo
cations of entitlements. By ex ante decisions I mean throughout this
Article those decisions that (i) take place before decisions whether to
undertake externality-producing actions are made, and (ii) influence
the parties' potential payoffs with or without these externality
producing actions. Thus, in the considered example, the ex post pay
offs of Factory and Resort with and without pollution might be a
product of their ex ante decisions whether to locate along the river in
the first place and, if so, how close to the river to locate; what scope of
activities to develop; what products or services to provide; how many
workers to hire and how much to invest in their human capital; and so
forth. Such ex ante decisions are ubiquitous, of course, and they criti
cally affect the ex post structure of cases the law must address.5
ing: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681
(1973); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic
Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1996); James E. Krier & Stuart J. Schwab, Property Rules
and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440 (1995); A.
Mitchell Polinsky, Controlling Externalities and Protecting Entitlements: Property Right, Li
ability Rule, and Tax-Subsidy Approaches, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1979) [hereinafter Polinsky,
Controlling Externalities]; A. Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple
Economics of Injunctive and Damage Remedies, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1075 (1980) [hereinafter
Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes].
4. R.H. Coase, The Problem ofSocial Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
5. Some of the researchers whose analysis focused on what I term ex post effects also
recognized the presence of what I term ex ante effects. In particular, Kaplow and Shavell,
supra note 3, at 738-39, discuss how any protection of victims might discourage them from
making investments that would reduce the potential harm to them from externality
producing actions. Kaplow and Shavell indicate that such a factor might influence the choice
of rule, but they do not attempt to analyze the range of ex ante effects or the conditions un
der which any given rule would be optimal from an ex ante perspective. Ayres and Talley,
supra note 3, also discuss how ex ante considerations might militate against the use of liabil-
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To study the ex ante dimension of the Cathedral in isolation from
the ex post problems extensively studied in prior work, I will put aside
these problems by assuming that ex post bargaining between the par
ties is easy. It is worth stressing, however, that I have no doubt that ex
post considerations are important for legal decisionmaking in the ex
ternalities context. To analyze the ex ante effects, however, it will be
useful to abstract from the ex post problems, and to this end I will fo
cus in this Article on situations in which ex post bargaining is easy.
In examining the ex ante effects of alternative rules, my analysis
builds on the large economic literature analyzing "incomplete con
tracts."6 This literature has sought to analyze how the potential divi
sion of surplus in later renegotiations might affect earlier investments.
Although this literature has focused on contexts that differ from the
harmful-externalities context on which I focus, its analytical approach
has been useful for carrying out my analysis.
It is worthwhile highlighting at the outset some general differences
between an ex ante and an ex post analysis. From an ex post perspec
tive, the distribution of ex post value between the parties has no rele
vance for efficiency. To be sure, writers carrying an ex post analysis
have differed on whether the distributive consequences of alternative
rules have some importance by themselves, independent of the goal of
efficiency. Such writers have nevertheless generally shared the view
that ex post distribution is irrelevant from the perspective of efficiency
itself.
As the analysis of this Article demonstrates, however, once ex ante
effects are taken into account, the ex post division of value might have
considerable efficiency implications. Different divisions of ex post
value lead to different ex ante actions and investments. As a result, a
given rule's effects on the ex post division of the total pie have an im
portant effect on the overall ex ante efficiency of the rule.
Relatedly, the introduction of ex ante effects also makes the choice
of legal rule important in cases in which ex post bargaining is easy. The
standard ex post analysis assumes that, when the parties can easily
bargain ex post, the choice of legal rule has little or no relevance for
efficiency. In such cases, ex post bargaining can be expected to pro
duce an efficient outcome regardless of the initial allocation of enti
tlements. For this reason, prior work has commonly focused on cases
in which ex post bargaining is difficult or even impossible.

ity rules, but they focus on the beneficial effect that liability rules have on ex post bargaining.
Id. at 1083-90.
6. See generally, OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE
(1995); Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A The
ory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON., 691 (1986); Oliver Hart & John
Moore, Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation, 56 ECONOMETRICA 755 (1988); Oliver Hart
& John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1119 ( 1990).
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As the analysis of this Article will show, however, once we take ex
ante effects into account, the choice of rule might have important effi
ciency implications even when ex post bargaining is easy. By affecting
the bargaining positions of each party in ex post bargaining, the choice
of rule will affect the ex post division of value. This ex post division of
value, in tum, will affect ex ante incentives and thereby ex ante effi
ciency.
My analysis therefore begins by examining how various alternative
rules affect bargaining between parties and, in turn, the ex post divi
sion of value. To illustrate these effects, note that, in the considered
example, Factory would generally fare better if it had a property right
to pollute rather than if Resort had a property right to enjoin Factory's
pollution. Suppose that Factory and Resort can freely bargain with
one another, and suppose also that pollution would be efficient be
cause the value to Factory of the pollution-causing activity exceeds the
harm it imposes on Resort. Given easy ex post bargaining, both rules
would result in polluting by Factory. The rules would differ, however,
in the distribution of value between Factory and Resort that they
would produce.
If Factory had the property right, it could keep the full value of its
pollution-producing activities to itself. By contrast, if Resort had the
property right, Factory would not be able to capture fully the value of
its pollution-producing activity. Resort would be able to extract some
of this value in exchange for consenting to Factory"s pollution.7
After identifying the distributive effects of alternative rules, the
analysis will examine how these different ex post distributions of value
affect parties' ex ante investments. Consider the incentives for Factory
to invest ex ante in enhancing the value it can derive from its activities.
If Resort had a property.right to enjoin Factory, Factory would invest
too little ex ante, because Resort's property right would enable Resort
to extract part of the value created by this investment. Because Fac
tory can anticipate this need to share the value of its activity with Re
sort, it would not have incentives to invest optimally. In contrast, if
Factory were granted a property right to pollute, Factory would not
have to share with Resort any part of the value produced by Factory's
ex ante investment. Thus, granting a property right to Factory would
encourage it to invest ex ante. Indeed, for reasons to become clear
later, if Factory were granted a property right, it would even tend to
invest excessively.
Now suppose that Resort were granted an entitlement to a pollu
tion-free river but with the weaker protection of a liability rule. In this
7. Similarly, if pollution were inefficient, any allocation of entitlements would result in
no pollution, but different rules would produce different distributions of total value. If Re
sort were granted the property right, it would not have to pay to induce Factory not to pol
lute, whereas if Factory received the property right, Resort would have to pay.
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case, Factory would still have an incentive to invest. Under this liabil
ity rule, if Factory were to operate, Factory would pay Resort the
(court-estimated) harm that pollution would inflict on Resort. As a re
sult, Factory would retain the excess of the value of its activity over
this harm, and Factory would thus fully capture any incremental in
crease in the value produced by its ex ante investment. Consequently,
Factory would have an incentive to invest at the efficient level.
Consider also the effects of the allocation of entitlements on Re
sort's incentives to invest ex ante in enhancing the value of its activi
ties. If Resort were granted a property right to pollution-free water,
Resort would have incentives to invest, and indeed might even invest
excessively. Providing Resort with the entitlement protected only by a
liability rule would not solve this problem of excessive investment. In
deed, as the analysis will show, liability rule protection would lead Re
sort to make investments that would be excessive to a degree even
greater than under a property-right rule.
In addition to ex ante investments in enhancing the values of the
parties' respective activities, the analysis will also examine Factory's
and Resort's ex ante investments in reducing the harm that would re
sult in the event of conflicting use. Factory and Resort, for example,
could make investments to eliminate or reduce their reliance on the
river in case a conflicting use problem arises down the road. The
choice of rule might affect also these investments.
If Resort were granted the entitlement with a liability-rule protec
tion, Resort would have no incentive to make any such potentially
harm-reducing investments. In this case, however, Factory would have
an incentive to invest in harm reduction at the socially optimal level.
In contrast, giving a property right to either of the parties would pro
vide each party with incentives to make some - but less than socially
optimal - investments in harm reduction.
The choice of legal rule thus involves a number of ex ante consid
erations. The optimal rule from an ex ante perspective depends on a
balance of these considerations. The analysis of this Article will pro
vide a framework for determining which allocations of entitlements
would perform best from the perspective of ex ante efficiency. This
framework could be used in answering the two questions that, for any
given context involving externalities, the law must resolve: (i) which
party should get the entitlement?, and (ii) what form of protection
should be provided to this party?
The analysis will show that, from the perspective of ex ante effi
ciency, liability rules are not generally superior to property rights. This
conclusion is worth noting because the literature has identified certain
ex post advantages of liability rules. The analysis also indicates that we
may want to expand our menu of alternative rules and include in it li
ability rules based on supercompensatory or undercompensatory dam
ages. Finally, the analysis identifies certain advantages that the use of
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government fines and taxes has in terms of inducing optimal ex ante
investments.
Before proceeding, I should note that the analysis of this Article is
limited to the choice between property rules and liability rules in cases
of harmful externalities. Calabresi and Melamed's article raised the
question of why, in cases involving possessory interests, courts gener
ally protect ownership with a property right rather than a liability rule.
As Kaplow and Shaven have demonstrated, however, this protection
of-ownership context differs substantially from the harmful
externalities context.8 In another work, I carry out an ex ante analysis
of the protection-of-ownership question.9
The remainder of this Article is organized as follows. Part II intro
duces the problem of externalities and discusses the differences be
tween ex post and ex ante perspectives. Part III analyzes the effects of
alternative legal rules on the ex post division of value between parties.
Part IV uses this analysis to identify and examine the effects of alter
native rules on parties' ex ante investments. Part V discusses the im
plications that ex ante considerations have for legal policy and the se
lection of legal rules. Part VI concludes.
II. THE EX POST VIEW OF THE CATHEDRAL
A.

The Conflicting-Use Problem

This Section discusses the question occupying both prior literature
and this Article: How should we address the extremely common situa
tion in which uses of assets conflict - that is, in which the use of one
asset imposes an externality on the use of another asset? For exposi
tional convenience, the analysis will proceed with reference to a para
digmatic example. As will be apparent, however, the conclusions de
rived with respect to this paradigmatic case have general applicability
to other cases of harmful externalities.
To continue with our example from the preceding Part, suppose
again that an industrial factory, Factory, stands on a river upstream
and a recreational resort, Resort, stands on the river downstream. The
time is the year 2000. At this point in time a problem of conflicting use
of the river's water arises and must be resolved by the law. As is stan
dard in the analysis of ex post problems, this Part assumes that all the
elements characterizing the problem have been fixed: the parties al
ready exist in their respective locations and face certain potential
8. See generally Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 757-83.

9. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Ownership and Exchange (2001) (unpublished working pa
per) (on file with author).
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benefits and costs from using the river. The following Parts will relax
this restrictive assumption.
The conflicting use problem arises because Factory might benefit
from engaging in a certain activity that would affect the river's water in
a way that might impose harm on Resort. I will refer to this use of the
water by Factory as "polluting" the water, and I will denote the benefit
that Factory would derive from this activity as VF' Thus, if Factory
were not to pollute, it would lose VF. For the purpose of my analysis, it
does not matter whether Factory's considered activity is the only ac
tivity available to Factory or whether there are additional activities
that do not pollute the river. It matters only that this polluting activity
would provide Factory with a value, which would not materialize oth
erwise, in the amount of VF'
Further suppose that pollution of the river's water by Factory
would reduce the value of a potential activity of Resort. If the water
remained free of Factory's pollution, Resort's activity would generate
a value of Vw If Factory were to pollute the water, however, Resort's
activity would generate only a value of VR H, where H represents the
loss that Resort would suffer from pollution as a result of, say, a de
cline in the prices it could charge or a decrease in the number of its pa
trons.
Note that Resort can always shut down its activity altogether
rather than operate suboptimally under pollution. Hence, if pollution
would cause Resort a level of harm exceeding the value of its activity,
Resort can simply cease to engage in the activity, thereby limiting it
self to a loss of Vw Accordingly, the damages Resort will suffer will
never exceed VR and will always equal the lesser of VR and H. Again,
for the purposes of our analysis it does not matter whether the activity
in question constitutes Resort's sole activity or merely one among
many; it only matters that Factory's pollution would damage one of
Resort's activities in an amount equal to the lesser of H and VR.
We can view the scenario described above as one involving an ex
ternality problem. Factory externalizes part of the costs produced by
its activity. This externality equals the amount by which Factory's ac
tivity reduces the value of Resort's activity and thus equals the lesser
of VR and H. We can also refer to the problem as a conflicting-use
problem. Both parties would benefit from using the water, but because
the water can only be either polluted or unpolluted, both parties can
not simultaneously use the water to their maximum benefit. Thus, a
conflict arises: one party desires to use the water in a way inconsistent
with the other party's desired use.
I shall refrain from labeling Factory as the "injurer" or Resort as
the "victim." Although convenient, these labels carry normative bag
gage because we tend to perceive of the "injurer" as the party that
causes the conflicting-use problem. As Coase has taught us, however,
we should view the problem as a priori symmetric, with both parties
-
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causing the conflicting-use situation. To be sure, but for Factory, Re
sort could use the unpolluted water to its own benefit. On the other
hand, but for Resort, Factory could pollute the water to its own bene
fit just as well. Both parties thus contribute an essential element to the
existence of the conflicting-use problem.
B.

The Efficient Ex Post Outcome

The most efficient resolution of the conflicting-use problem is the
outcome that would maximize total aggregate value given the struc
ture of the situation and the values of VF, VR, and H. As Table 1 below
indicates, there are three possible scenarios as to which outcome
would be efficient.
(i) Scenario FR. In this scenario, it would be efficient for both Fac
tory and Resort to engage in their respective activities; that is, Factory
should pollute and Resort should continue its activity despite the pol
lution. This scenario arises whenever the following two conditions
hold true: (i) the value that pollution would bring to Factory would ex
ceed the harm it would cause Resort (VF > H); but (ii) Resort still
would derive a positive value from its activity, despite the harm from
pollution (VR >H).
(ii) Scenario F. In this scenario, it would be efficient that only Fac
tory engage in its activity; that is, Factory should pollute, and Resort
should shut down its harmed activity. This scenario would arise when
ever the following two conditions hold true: (i) the harm Resort would
suffer exceeds the benefit it would gain if it engaged in its activity de
spite pollution (VR < H); but (ii) the benefit Factory would derive from
polluting exceeds the harm that pollution would cause Resort ( VF >
VR).
(iii) Scenario R. In this scenario, efficiency calls for only Resort to
engage in its activity and for Factory to shut down. This scenario arises
whenever both the harm to Resort caused by pollution and the value
of Resort's activity exceed the value of the polluting activity to Factory
(H >VF and VR >VF).
TABLE 1. THE THREE SCENARIOS
Factory Undertakes

Resort Undertakes

Polluting Activity?

Activity?

Total Social Value

FR

Yes

Yes

V, + v.-H

F

Yes

No

v,

R

No

Yes

v.

Outcome
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Law's Choice: Calabresi and Melamed's Four Rules

What legal rules should govern the conflicting-use problem? In
analyzing this question, I will use the classification of alternative legal
rules put forward by Calabresi and Melamed and subsequently fol
lowed by much of the literature.10 Under this classification, four alter
native rules need to be considered:11
(i) Entitlement to Resort Protected by a Property Right (the RP
rule). Under this rule, Resort has an entitlement to operate free of
pollution under the protection of a property right. In this case, if Re
sort does not wish to allow Factory to pollute, Resort can secure an
injunction against Factory (backed, if needed, by criminal sanctions).
(ii) Entitlement to Resort Protected by a Liability Rule (the RL
rule). Under this rule, Resort again has an entitlement to operate free
of pollution, but this time under the weaker protection of a liability
rule. Factory may elect to pollute, but in this case it would have to pay
Resort a court-estimated amount for the damages caused to Resort.
Recall that these damages would equal the smaller of the harm re
sulting from the pollution and the value of Resort's activity in the ab
sence of pollution - that is, the smaller of H and VR
as Resort
would always have the option of shutting down its activity.
(iii) Entitlement to Factory Protected by a Property Right (the FP
rule). Under this rule, Factory has an entitlement to pollute protected
by a property right. Therefore, Factory would be free to pollute at its
discretion.
(iv) Entitlement to Factory Protected by a Liability Rule (the FL
rule). Under this rule, Factory again has an entitlement to pollute but
this time under the weaker protection of a liability rule. In this case,
Resort may still make Factory cease its polluting activity, but if Resort
were to do so, Resort would have to pay Factory an amount that
equals the court-estimated damages caused to Factory as a result: the
loss of the value Vr Note that the FL rule is rarely used in practice,
-

10. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1, at 1 115-16; see also Frank I. Michelman,
Pollution as a Tort: A Non-Accidental Perspective on Calabresi's Costs, 80 YALE L.J. 647,
670 (1971) (reviewing GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970)).
1 1 . As will be clear to readers, the analysis of this Article can be extended to identify the
ex ante effects of additional rules. Some recent work has suggested additional rules based on
the use of options. See, e.g. , Ian Ayres, The 1998 Monsanto Lecture: Protecting Property with
Puts, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 793 (1998) (reviewing the choice of rule within the put/call frame
work); Ayres & Balkin, supra note 3, at 729-33 (discussing put options and the way these op
tions might be auctioned); Krier & Schwab, supra note 3, at 471-72 (envisioning a rule
granting Factory the option to shut down its activity and collect damages from Resort); Saul
Levmore, Unifying Remedies: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Startling Rules, 106 YALE
L.J. 2149, 2153-60 (1997) (suggesting additional rules); RONEN AVRAHAM, MODULAR
LIABILITY RULES, (Olin Center for Law and Economics, University of Michigan, Working
Paper No. 01-003) (analyzing a group of options-based rules).
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perhaps due to the stringent informational requirements it imposes on
courts. For the sake of completeness, however, I will include this rule
in the analysis.12
Significantly, all of these rules differ in the informational require
ments they impose on courts. Under both property rules, FP and RP,
the court needs only to verify whether Factory pollutes the river. In
contrast, under the RL rule, a court not only has to verify whether
Factory pollutes but also to estimate the damages produced by the
pollution. The imperfect information of courts might therefore make it
difficult to obtain ex post efficiency. To focus on the analysis of ex
ante effects, however, I shall put aside these informational issues, and
I shall assume for simplicity that courts can ex post accurately observe
H, VF> and Vw
D . Ex Post vs. Ex Ante Efficiency
1.

From Ex Post to Ex Ante

As already emphasized, prior work has largely focused on identi
fying the rule that would facilitate attainment of the ex post efficient
outcome. Taking as given the presence of a potential externality, and
recognizing that in a world of costless bargaining the efficient outcome
will always occur under any of the four rules, Calabresi and Melamed
stressed the importance of identifying the impediments to an ex post
efficient outcome.13 Having identified these impediments, the efficient
allocation of entitlements in any given case would be the one that
would most likely attain the ex post efficient outcome. Much work has
subsequently focused on this question.
Although the ex post view yields insights that have much relevance
for legal policymaking, such an analysis is significantly incomplete. In
the context of our paradigmatic example, an ex post analysis would
take as given the existence of Factory and Resort in the year 2000;
their location along the river; and the potential costs and benefits that
would arise from pollution or from its absence, which we have denoted
by VF> VR, and H. With these elements taken as given, the focus is on
which legal rule would lead to the efficient ex post outcome.

12. But see Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del. E. Webb Dev. Co. , 469 P.2d 700 (Ariz. 1972) (or
dering a cattle feedlots operator to shut down, and the developer of a neighboring retirement
community to indemnify the feedlots operator for the costs of moving or shutting down). See
generally Krier & Schwab, supra note 3, at 467-70 (discussing in detail the "paradox of rule
four"). But see A. Douglas Melamed, Remarks: A Public Law Perspective, 106 YALE L.J.
2209 (1997) (arguing that "Rule 4" remedies are widely used in public law contexts).
13 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1, at 1 106-11 (analyzing how different types of
transaction costs affect the choice between property rights and liability rules).
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These elements of the situation, however, might very well have
arisen as a function of actions occurring at some point in the past,
which in tum may well have been influenced by the legal rule that the
parties anticipated would govern in the event that a conflicting-use
problem would arise in the future. As a result, the choice of legal rule
has important ex ante effects. Before turning to a detailed analysis of
these effects, however, I wish to make two general observations about
the consequences of incorporating such effects into the analysis.
2.

Ex Post Distribution Matters for Efficiency

Clearly, the choice of legal rule can have significant distributive
consequences, affecting how total value is divided between Factory
and Resort. Prior work has recognized this effect that rules have on
the final distribution of value.14 This literature has generally taken the
view, however, that these distributional consequeqces have no rele
vance for efficiency. Rather, in the standard ex post analysis, efficiency
consists only of ensuring ex post that factory would pollute if and
when doing so would be efficient - that is, would maximize the total
pie of the parties.
To be. sure, commentators have expressed different views on
whether distribution of this total ex post pie should constitute an inde
pendent objective of legal policy. Calabresi and Melamed, for exam
ple, take the view that "difficult as wealth distribution preferences are
to analyze, it should be obvious that they play a crucial role in the set
ting of entitlements."15 In contrast, Kaplow and Shaven have taken the
view that "concern about the distribution of income has no bearing on
the choice between property rules and liability rules."16
Nonetheless, writers have generally shared the view that, as far as
efficiency is concerned, the ex post distribution of value does not mat
ter. For example, although Calabresi and Melamed believe that the
distributional consequences of the choice of rules should be given
some weight in themselves,17 they view these distributional conse-

14. See, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1, at 1098-1102; Polinsky, Resolving Nui
sance Disputes, supra note 3 at 1089-92.
15. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1, at 1098.
16. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 744; see also Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell,
Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 ·J.
LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994) (arguing that the choice of legal rules should not be influenced by
distributional considerations because redistributing income through the income tax and
transfer systems would be superior).
17. Indeed, as mentioned earlier, Calabresi and Melamed consider distribution a legiti
mate objective of legal policy. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1, at 1098-1102, 1 1 10.
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quences as irrelevant for the evaluation of this choice from the per
spective of efficiency.18
Once we take ex ante considerations into account, the distribution
of the ex post value does make a difference to overall-efficiency. The
size of the total pie under the most efficient ex post outcome depends
on the parties' ex ante actions and investments. These actions and in
vestments, in tum, depend in part on the ex post distribution of value
that the parties anticipate ex ante. Hence, total value - that is, the to
tal size of the pie - depends not only on whether a legal rule reaches
the efficient outcome in any given ex post situation, but also on which
ex post situation the rule produces in the first place.
It is worth comparing the point under consideration to the claim
made by various writers that distribution might affect efficiency be
cause changes in the final distribution of wealth might affect parties'
relative valuations of an entitlement.19 In our example, for instance, it
might be argued that, for any given ex post situation, the value that
Factory and Resort would place on the river's water would not be in
dependent of the allocation of entitlements.
Although the point made by these writers and the point made in
this Section both imply that ex post distribution matters for efficiency,
they very much differ. Note that these writers do not claim that ignor
ing distributional effects might lead to an inefficient outcome. Rather,
they claim only that the efficient outcome and efficient rule are often
indeterminate. Consequently, they argue efficiency alone cannot pro
vide a basis for selecting between two equally efficient outcomes and
the rules that underlie them. In contrast, the analysis of this Article
suggests that ignoring the ex ante effects of the final distribution of
value might sometimes lead to the selection of a rule that would be
unambiguously less efficient.

18. Id. at 1093-98, 1106-10.
19. Such claims were made in works by scholars associated with the Critical Legal Stud
ies movement. See Mark Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology in
the Coase Theorem, 52 S. CALL. REV. 669, 678-95 (1979) (arguing that the price that a party
is willing to pay prevent a harm from happening might differ from the price the party will ask
for allowing the harm to happen, and analyzing the implications of this phenomenon for the
Coase theorem); Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Cri
tique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387, 401-21 (1981) (noting the same). Work in behavioral economics
and in psychology has shown that initial allocations of entitlements can indeed affect valua
tions. See, e.g. , W. Michael Hanemann et al., Willingness to Pay and Willingness to Accept:
How Much Can They Differ?, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 635 (1991); Elizabeth Hoffman & Mat
thew L. Spitzer, Willingness to Pay vs. Willingness to Accept: Legal and Economic Implica
tions, 71 WASH. U. L. Q. 59 (1993) (investigating evidence on the divergence between will
ingness-to-accept and willingness-to-pay measures of value and exploring the implications of
the divergence for analysis in law and economics); Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental
Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325, 1329-42
(1990) (reporting experiments showing asking prices to be higher than offer prices).
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Rules Matter Even When Ex Post Bargaining Is Easy

From the ex post perspective extensively applied by prior work,
legal rules matter only when parties cannot easily bargain ex post. In
the context of our example, this position implies that legal rules woulq
matter only if, in the year 2000 when Factory and Resort confront. the
conflicting-use problem, they were unable to bargain easily and reach
an agreement. For this reason, an ex post analysis directs our attention
to cases in which ex post bargaining is difficult or even impossible.
Once ex ante considerations are taken into account, however, the
choice of legal rule might matter greatly even where parties can easily
bargain ex post. Suppose that, in the year 2000, Factory and Resort
can successfully bargain, and thereby attain the ex post efficient out
come, under any legal rule. The choice of legal rule inight still have
substantial influence on the ultimate division of value hetween. Factory
and Resort and thus, in turn, substantial influence on Factory and Re
sort's ex ante incentives. As a result, even assuming easy bargaining in
2000, alternative legal rules can substantially differ in their effects on
overall efficiency.
Of course, the suggestion that rules matter also when ex post bar
gaining is easy does not take issue with the Coase theorem. In a world
with no transaction costs at any point in time, parties would reach
agreements at early stages to ensure that they make all their ex ante
investments efficiently. A truly Coasean, transaction-cost-free world
involves freedom from transaction costs not only at the time in which
the externality arises but also at any earlier point in time in which
some relevant investments and actions take place. The absence of
transaction costs ex post, however, does not imply the presence of
Coasean bargaining in all relevant earlier points in time. Thus, even
when bargaining is ex post very easy, the choice of legal rule might
matter in terms of efficiency.
III. THE EFFECT OF RULES ON THE EX POST DIVISION OF VALUE
Having made some general observations about ex ante considera
tions, I now turn to analyzing how the choice of rule affects ex ante ac
tions and decisions. This Part will take the first step in this analysis by
comparing alternative rules in terms of their effects on the ex postdi
vision of value.20
To abstract away from ex post issues, I will assume that the parties
can easily, and indeed with. no impediments whatsoever, bargain ex
20. For an analysis of the effects of property rights and liability rules on the division of
value in disputes between patent-holders and second-stage inventors infringing on these pat
ents, see Mark Schankerman & Suzanne Scotchmer, Damages and Injunctions in Protecting
Intellectual Property, 32 RAND J. ECON. 199 (2001).
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post. This implies, among other things, that bargaining involves nei
ther transaction costs nor informational asymmetries.
In particular, I assume that both parties know each other's payoffs.
I also assume that courts can accurately assess all the values relevant
for implementing the rules under consideration. Under these condi
tions, the parties will reach the ex post efficient outcome under any
one of the alternative rules. The division of value, however, will differ
considerably among alternative legal rules.
For the ease of exposition, I make the simplifying assumption that
the parties have equal bargaining power and therefore will share
equally in any gains from mutual trade. This assumption will not affect
our qualitative conclusions about ex ante effects, and it will be appar
ent to the reader that the analysis can be adjusted to accommodate dif
ferent assumptions about the parties' relative bargaining power.
Below I will analyze bargaining and the distribution of value pro
duced by it in each of the three scenarios concerning the efficient out
come identified in Section 11.B.
A

Scenario FR: Factory and Resort Should Both Operate

In this scenario, both Factory and Resort should operate. As iden
tified earlier, this scenario arises whenever VF > H and VR > H. Under
the RP rule, Factory must secure Resort's consent to conduct its pol
luting activity. When pollution takes place, Resort's value from its own
activity is reduced by H, but Factory obtains a value of VF' The net so
cial surplus created by pollution, then, equals VF - H. In order to ob
tain Resort's consent, Factory would have to compensate Resort for its
damages, H, as well as pay Resort part of this net surplus.
Therefore, under the assumption that the parties share equally in
gains from trade, Factory would pay Resort for its harm, H, plus half
the amount of VF- H. The final division of value would thus be as fol
lows: Factory would net 0.5(VF- H), and Resort would net VR + 0.5(VF
- H). The property protection that Resort enjoys would enable it not
only to recover compensation for its damages from pollution but also
to extract some of the surplus generated by Factory's activity.
In contrast, under the RL rule, Factory could pollute the river
without Resort's consent as long as it pays Resort damages in an
amount that equals H. In the scenario under consideration, the benefit
of pollution to Factory exceeds the harm that pollution causes Resort
.
( VF > H). Thus, Factory would decide to pollute and compensate Re
'sort for H. Factory, however, would not need to offer Resort any part
of the surplus produced by Factory's activity. Under the final division
of value, Factory would net VF H, and Resort would net VR' Under
liability-rule protection, no bargaining would take place because Re-
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sort could not extract from Factory an amount exceeding H and would
have no reason to agree to any amount below H.
Under the FP rule, Factory's property right would enable it to op
erate and pollute. Because it is efficient for Factory to operate in the
scenario under consideration, the parties would have no incentive to
bargain for a reallocation of their entitlements. Under the final divi
sion of value, Factory would net VF, and Resort would net VR H.
Under an FL rule, Resort would have the right to prevent Factory
from polluting if it pays Factory damages in the amount of VF" In the
scenario under consideration, however, the harm to Resort from pollu
tion would be less than the value of pollution to Factory. Hence, Re
sort would prefer to operate under pollution rather than exercise the
option granted to it by the rule. In the final division of total value be
tween the parties, Factory would net VF, and Resort would net
VR-H.
-

TABLE 2. DIVISION OF VALUE IN SCENARIO FR
Payments Made by
Rule

Factory

Value to Factory

Value to Resort

Total Value

RP

H + O.S(V,.- H)

0.5(V,.- H)

v. + 0.5(V, - H)

V, + v. - H

RL

H

V, - H

v.

V, + V. - H

FP

No Payment

v,

v. - H

V, + v. - H

FL

No Payment

v,

V. - H

V, + V. -H

B.

Scenario F: Only Factory Should Operate

In this scenario, it is efficient for Factory to operate and for Resort
to shut down its activity. As noted earlier, this scenario arises when
ever VR < H and VF> H.
Under the RP rule, Resort would have a right to operate and pol
lute. Given that the value of pollution to Factory would exceed the
value to Resort of operating free of pollution, however, Resort would
"sell" its right to Factory and shut down its operations because such a
transaction would produce a surplus of VF -Vw In such an exchange,
Factory would be expected to pay Resort an amount that would com
pensate Resort for the forgone value of its activity and, furthermore,
would provide Resort with a fraction of the surplus produced by the
exchange. Under the assumption of equal sharing of surplus, Resort
would end up netting VR +0.5(VF-VR), and Factory would end up net
ting VF-0.5(VF +VJ.
Under the RL rule, Factory would be able to operate without Re
sort's consent, provided only that Factory pay Resort its damages. Be-
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cause it would be efficient for Resort to shut down its activity alto
gether in the presence of pollution, these damages would equal Vw
Whereas Resort would be compensated for the lost benefit from its
potential activity, Resort would be unable to extract from Factory any
thing more than these damages. The final division of value would pro
vide Factory with a net value of VF - VR and Resort with a net value of
Vw
Under the FP rule, Factory would have the right to operate with
out paying any damages. Because it would indeed be efficient for Fac
tory to operate, the parties would have no incentive to bargain over a
reallocation of entitlements. Also, because the potential harm to Re
sort from operating under pollution would exceed the potential value
to Resort from its activity, Resort would shut down. In the final divi
sion of value, Factory would net VF and Resort would end up with no
value.
Finally, under the FL rule, Resort would have the power to force
Factory to shut down its polluting activity by paying Factory damages
equal to the value of Factory's activity, Vr However, because the
value of Factory's activity exceeds the potential value of Resort's ac
tivity, VF > VR, Resort would prefer not to exercise this option and
would shut down its own activity instead. The final division of value
would provide Factory with a net value of VF and provide Resort with
no value.
TABLE 3. DIVISION OF VALUE IN SCENARIO F
Payments Made by
Rule

Factory

Value to Factory

Value to Resort

Total Value

RP

v. + 0.5(V, - V.)

V, - 0.5(V, + V.)

0.5(V. + V,)

v,

RL

v.

V,- v.

v.

v,

FP

No Payment
No Payment

v,

0

v,

v,

0

v,

FL

C.

Scenario R: Only Resort Should Operate

In this scenario, it is efficient for Resort to operate and for Factory
to shut down, as VF is lower than both H and Vw
Under the RP rule, Factory would be allowed to operate only if it
obtained Resort's consent, but it would not be worthwhile for Factory
·to pay as much as would be needed to obtain such consent. Because
the value of Factory's polluting activity in the considered scenario
does not exceed the damages from pollution to Resort, the parties
would have no incentive to bargain over the reallocation of rights.
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Factory would end up with no value, and Resort would end up with a
value of VR.
Under the RL rule, Factory would prefer to shut down its activity
rather than operate and pay the damages to Resort as required by the
rule. Thus, again, Factory would end up with no value, and Resort
would end up with VR'
Under the FP rule, Factory would agree not to use its right to op
erate in return for a payment from Resort. In this exchange, Factory
would be able to extract a price equal to the value of its activity, VF,
plus a fraction of the surplus produced by the exchange.
The size of this surplus would depend on the relative magnitudes of
H and VR. In the case in which the value of Resort's activity exceeds
the potential harm from pollution, VR > H, the damages to Resort
from pollution would equal H, and the surplus from Factory's shutting
down its activity would be H -VF. Under the assumption of equal bar
gaining power, Factory would receive an amount equal to the forgone
benefits from its polluting activity, VF' plus half the surplus, that is,
0.5(H - VF). Resort in turn would end up with a value equal to VR
minus the payment of VF + 0.5(H - VF) made to Factory, an amount
equal to VR-0.5(VF +H).
In contrast, in the case in which the potential harm to Resort from
pollution exceeds the value of Resort's activity, H > VR, pollution
would lead Resort to shut down, the damages to Resort from pollution
would be VR, and the surplus produced by Factory's shutting down
would thus be VR - Vr Under the assumption of equal bargaining
power, Resort would again pay Factory for its forgone benefits, VF,
plus half the net surplus, VR -VF, and Factory thus would end up with
a value of 0.5(VR +VF). Resort would end up with a value of VR -VF 0.S(VR-VF), an amount equal to VR - 0.5(VR +VF).
Finally, under the FL rule, Resort would have the power to pre
vent Factory's pollution by paying Factory damages in an amount
equal to the value of its forgone activity, Vr In this case, Factory
would not be able to extract from Resort any payment in excess of VF
but, on the other hand, would have no reason to accept any offer of
payment below Vr The final division of value thus would provide
Factory with a net value of VF and Resort with a net value of VR - Vr
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TABLE 4. DIVISION OF VALUE IN SCENARIO R
Payments Made

. '

Rule ·

by Resort

Value to Factory

Value to Resort

Total Value

RP

No Payment

0

VR

VR

RL

No Payment

0

VR

VR

FP

V, + 0.5(H - V,)

0.S(V, + H)

(if VR > H)

(if VR > H)

VR - 0.5(V, + H)
(if VR > H)

FL

or

or

or

v, + 0.5(VR - V,)

0.5(V, + VR)

(if VR < H)

(if VR < H)

VR - 0.5(V, + VR)
(if VR < H)

v,

v,

VR - v,

VR

VR

The analysis of this final scenario .R completes our comparison of
the legal rules in terms of their ex post distributive consequences. I
shall now tum to examine how these differences in ex post division
translate into different ex ante behavior as well.
IV. THE EX ANTE EFFECTS OF ALTERNATIVE RULES
This Part analyzes the effects of alternative rules on ex ante in
vestments. Section A introduces ex ante investments into the analysis.
Sections B and C then examine the effects of the four alternative rules
on parties' ex ante investments in enhancing the values of their activi
ties. Section D next analyzes the rules' effects on ex ante investment in
harm reduction. Finally, Section E provides an overall comparison of
the rules in terms of their ex ante effects.
A.

Introducing Ex Ante Investments

Following the standard analysis of . the ex post problem, we have
thus far treated as given the values defining the situation at hand: the
potential value of Factory's activity, VF; the potential value of Resort's
activity, VR; and the potential harm resulting from joint operation by
the parties, H. These values, however, might be a product of the par
ties' actions at earlier points in time.
For example, the value of Resort's and Factory's activities, VF and
VR, might be a function of their ex ante decisions about the scope of
their activities, their products or services, the number of their employ
ees, and their investments in the employees' human capital. Similarly,
the harm that would result from joint operation by Resort and Fac
tory, H, might also be a function of various ex ante actions and in-

620

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 100:601

vestments. For example, the magnitude of H might depend on the ex
tent to which Factory or Resort invested to reduce the reliance of their
respective activities on the river's water.
I will denote below as xF and x R the investments made ex ante by
Factory and Resort respectively in enhancing the value of their respec
tive activities. I will also denote below as yF and yR the investments in
harm-reduction made by· Factory and Resort respectively. I will as
sume that all these investments have the standard feature of dimin
ishing marginal effectiveness, with each additional dollar invested pro
ducing a positive but diminishing benefit.
Which ex post allocation of entitlements would provide the parties
with the best incentives for making these ex ante investments? In ex
amining this question, I will assume that courts cannot observe the
level of ex ante investments and that the ex post allocation of entitle
ments thus cannot be made dependent on such investments.21 Fur
thermore, I will focus on choosing a rule from among the four basic
legal rules that Calabresi and Melamed identified.
If the parties could negotiate ex ante - that is, prior to making
their investments - they could adopt an arrangement that would gov
ern the ex post allocation of entitlements. Even in such a case, it would
be valuable for lawmakers to identify the optimal arrangement and
provide it as a default. Moreover, in many situations where parties can
be expected to bargain ex post with ease, bargaining ex ante might still
be difficult, or even impossible, to conduct and successfully conclude.
In particular, conditions necessary for easy bargaining, such as ab
sence of informational asymmetries, might obtain ex post but not ex
ante. Even when parties are ex post informed about each other's po
tential payoffs, they might not possess such information ex ante. For
example, before the parties make their respective investments ex ante,
Factory and Resort might have some private information regarding
the effectiveness of their respective investments. After those invest
ments are made, and after the ex post situation crystallizes, the poten
tial payoff of each party might become apparent to the other side, but
that might not have been the case ex ante. The presence of ex ante in
formational asymmetries might therefore impede ex ante bargaining
and might make the choice of legal rule especially important.
Before proceeding to analyze how alternative rules affect ex ante
investments, let me note two assumptions that I will use for simplicity
of exposition. First, I will assume that ex ante investments do not
determine which of the three scenarios (FR, F, or R) will occur. Which
scenario · even:tually materializes will be assumed to depend on exoge
nous developments, say, in the markets within which Factory and Re21. This assumption is similar to the standard assumption made in the incomplete con
tracts literature that parties' ex ante investments are noncontractible. See, e.g. , HART, supra
note 6.
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sort operate. Ex ante investments, however, will be assumed to influ
ence parties' potential payoffs under each scenario.
Second, I will use specific numerical examples for the probabilities
of the three scenarios. It will be clear, however, that the reasoning and
q�alitative conclusions of the analysis will apply equally to any other
values that these probabilities might take. Specifically, I will assume
that the probability of scenario FR (in which it is efficient for both
Factory and Resort to operate) equals 1/2; that the probability of sce
nario F (in which it is efficient for only Factory to operate) equals 1/3;
and that the probability of scenario R (in which only Resort should
operate) equals 1/6.
B.

Investment by Factory to Enhance the Value of Its Activity

1.

The Socially Optimal Investment Level

From a social point of view, a party should invest up to the point
where marginal social benefit equals marginal social cost, such that
one dollar of investment produces one dollar of expected social value.
In our example, enhancement of VF will provide social value only in
those scenarios
F and FR -:- in which Factory will actually operate.
Consequently, the social value of increasing VF by $1 will be equal to
$1 multiplied by the combined probability of these two scenarios,
which is 5/6 (113 + 112) in our example. Thus, Factory should invest
only up to the point where 5/6 of the marginal increase in VF produced
by an additional dollar of investment falls to $1.22 As I now turn to
show, however, Factory's private calculus for its investment in en
hancing VF might diverge from the socially optimal calculus.
-

2.

Investment Under A lternative Rules

a. Entitlement to Resort with Property-Right Protection. As Part III
demonstrated, if Resort is given the entitlement with property-right
·
protection, then Resort will be able to extract value from Factory
whenever it is efficient for Factory to pollute. Thus, under an RP rule,
Resort will allow Factory to operate in scenarios FR and F in exchange
for part of the value produced by Factory's activity. Assuming that the
parties enjoy equal bargaining power, we haye concluded in Section
III that, in scenarios FR and F, Factory will capture only half of any
marginal increase in the value of Vr
22. This means that the socially optimal investment x satisfies 516 * V/(x) 1. More
generally, if P, and P,. denote the probabilities of scenarios F and FR, respectively, then the
optimal investment x will satisfy (P, + P,.) * V/(x) J .
=

=
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Consider now Factory's private calculus as to how much to invest
ex ante. Factory will, of course, bear the full cost of every dollar of
marginal increase in its investment, xF' Factory will benefit from a
marginal increase in the value of VF, however, only in scenarios F and
FR, which have a combined probability of 516. Moreover, even in
those scenarios Factory will capture only half of the marginal increase
in value of VF.
It follows that Factory will have no incentive to invest beyond the
point where 5/12 (which is 5/6 * 112) of the resulting marginal increase
in VF produced by an additional $1 of investment falls to $1.23 This im
plies that Factory will set its level of investment, xF, below the socially
optimal level because Factory will expect Resort to capture half of the
return produced by Factory's investment. Essentially, Factory will
bear the full cost of increasing xF but, under the RP rule, will capture
only half of the resulting social benefits. For this reason, Factory's in
centives to invest will be inadequate, and Factory will invest too little.24
b. Entitlement to Resort with Liability-Rule Protection. If Resort re
ceives the entitlement but with only liability-rule protection, Factory
will have to pay damages to Resort in scenarios F and FR. Recall,
however, that these payments of damages to Resort (H in scenario FR
and VR in scenario F) will not depend on the value of Factory's activ
ity, VF'
Consider Factory's private calculus as to how much to invest ex
ante under this rule. Again, Factory will bear the full cost of every
dollar of marginal increase in its investment, xF, and will benefit from
any resulting increase in VF only with a probability of 516, the com
bined likelihood of scenarios F and FR. Unlike the RP rule, however,
the RL rule will allow Factory to capture in these two scenarios the
full marginal increase in VF because Factory's payment to Resort un
der the RL rule will not depend on the value of VF' Therefore, Factory
will invest up to the point where 5/6 of the increase in VF produced an
additional $1 investment falls to $1.25
This conclusion implies that, under the RL rule, Factory will invest
at the socially optimal level. Because the payment that Factory will
23. Formally, Factory's investment under the rule would satisfy 516 * 112 * V/(x) 1.
More generally, let us assume that the bargaining between the parties will result in Resort's
capturing a fraction <P of the surplus and Factory's capturing the remaining fraction (J - ¢) of
the surplus. Under this more general assumption, Factory's investment would satisfy (PF +
PF.) * (1 - </J) * V/(x) 1 .
=

=

24. This result is similar to the standard result in the analysis of the standard hold-up
problem: when the value that a party A produces can be expected to become subject to a
hold-up by party B, party A will underinvest in enhancing this value. See, e.g. , HART, FIRMS,
CONTRACTS, supra note 6, at 39-42.
25. Formally, Factory's investment under the rule would satisfy 516 * V/(x) 1, which is
the condition defining the socially optimal level of investment. See supra note 22. More gen
erally, Factory's investment would satisfy (PF + PF.) * V/(x) 1 .
=

=
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have to make to Resort when Factory operates will not depend on the
value of Factory's activity, VF, Factory will be the "residual claimant"
that captures the full value of marginal increases in Vr As a result,
Factory's private incentives will induce it to invest optimally.
c. Entitlement to Factory with Property-Right Protection. Granting
Factory an entitlement with property-right protection will enable it to
capture value not only in scenarios F and FR but also in scenario R, in
which it is efficient for Factory to shut down its activity. In scenario R
Factory will be able to extract a payment from Resort in return for not
polluting. As Section III.C showed, in scenario R Factory will receive
an amount equal to VF, the amount Factory would be giving up by
shutting down its polluting activity plus, under the assumption of equal
bargaining power, half of the surplus produced by Factory's shutting
down, a surplus which will equal the lesser of (H - VF) or (V R - VF) .
Thus, Factory would get an amount equal to VF plus half of the higher
of (H -VF) and (VR -VF) , or, equivalently, half of VF plus half of the
higher of H and Vw
Now consider Factory's investment decision under the FP rule. As
always, Factory will bear the full cost of every marginal increase in its
investment. Factory will also capture the full value of its activity, VF, in
scenarios F and FR, which have a combined probability of 5/6, in
which Factory will operate. Finally, in scenario R, in which Factory
will shut down, Factory will still gain an amount equal to half of VF
plus half of the higher of H and V w Thus, on the whole, Factory will
make an expected gain of 1 1112 of each marginal increase in Vr Fac
tory therefore will invest up to the point where the marginal increase
in VF produced by an additional $1 investment falls to $11112.26
Recall, however, that Factory's socially optimal level of investment
is at the point where 5/6 of the marginal increase in VF falls to $1. It
follows that Factory will adopt under the FP rule an excessive - that
is, higher than socially optimal - level of investment Xr
Essentially, because Factory will be able to obtain benefit from an
increase in VF even in scenario R, in which Factory's activity would
shut down and produce no social value, Factory will obtain from its in
vestment some extra private benefits that will not reflect social value.
This divergence between the private and social calculus will lead Fac
tory to invest excessively.27
26. Formally, Factory's actual investment would satisfy [516 + (116 * 112)] * V/(x) 1.
More generally, relaxing the assumption of equal bargaining power, Factory's investment
would satisfy (PF + PFR + (1 </!) P.) * V/(x) 1 .
=

·

-

=

27. This result is similar to those results in the law and economics literature showing
that, in some contexts, compensating a party for a value that is not going to be in fact real
ized might lead to overinvestment. For example, Steve Shavell has shown that the expecta
tion damages remedy in contracts will lead to overinvestmerit in reliance. The relying party
will disregard the fact that its investment would not produce social value in the event that the
contract is breached because it would be compensated by the other side. See Steven Shavell,
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d. Entitlement to Factory with Liability-Rule Protection. Let us now
turn to the rule that also gives the entitlement to Factory but with only
liability-rule protection. Under this rule, Factory would again be able
to capture value not only in scenarios F and FR but also in scenario R
in which it would shut down its activity. In scenario R, Resort would
be able to make Factory shut down but would have to pay Factory the
forgone value of its Vr
Thus, under the FL rule, Factory will capture the marginal increase
in the value of VF resulting from its investment in every scenario, in
cluding scenario R in which the increase in the value of VF would pro
duce no social value. Thus, Factory will invest up to the point where
the increase in VF from an additional $1 of investment falls to $1.28
This level of investment by Factory will exceed the socially optimal
level. Furthermore, under the FL rule Factory would capture in sce
nario R the full marginal increase in the value of VF produced by addi
tional investment, whereas under the FP rule Factory would capture in
this scenario only half of such a marginal increase. It follows that the
FL rule would distort Factory's incentives even more severely in the
direction of excessive investment than would the FP rule.29

C.

Resort's Ex Ante Investment to Enhance the Value of Its Activity

1.

The Socially Optimal Investment Level

As already noted, from a social point of view, a party should invest
only up to the point where the marginal expected social value from
additional investment falls to its marginal cost. Increasing the value of
Vn would produce a social benefit only in scenarios R and FR, and it
would produce no social value in scenario F in which Resort would
Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 1 1 BELL J. ECON. 466 (1980). Similarly, Robert
Cooter and Louis Kaplow have suggested that full compensation for government takings
leads to overinvestment because parties disregard the fact that their investments might not
produce social value in the event that their property is taken by the government. See Robert
Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1
(1985); Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509
(1986).
28. Formally, Factory's investment under the rule would satisfy V/(x)

=

1.

29. Under the F L rule, Factory will net a lesser share o f the total ex post value than un
der the FP rule. As a consequence, Factory might appear at first glance to have a weaker
incentive to overinvest in VF under the FL rule than under the FP rule. The FL rule, how
ever, provides a stronger incentive on the margin to increase V,.. Under the FL rule, Factory
will capture in scenario R the full value of any increase in the value of V,.. In contrast, under
the FP rule in scenario R, Factory would in addition get half of the surplus - which would
be v. VF or H VF created by Factory's shutting down: Because increasing VF would re
duce this surplus, this extra element of value under the FP rule would operate to mitigate the
incentive to overinvest in increasing V,.. As a result, the overinvestment under the FP rule
will be less severe than under the FL rule.
-

-

-
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shut down its activity. Accordingly, an increase of $1 in the value of VR
would produce a social gain of $1 only in scenarios R and FR, which
have in our example a combined probability of 2/3 (116 + 112).
Resort should invest, then, up to the point where 2/3 of the
marginal increase in the value of VR produced by an additional $1 of
investment falls to $1.30 As we shall presently see, however, Resort's
private calculus would differ from the social calculus under some of
the alternative rules, and Resort would under these invest in enhanc
ing the value of its activity at an inefficient level.
2.

Investment Under Alternative Rules

a. Entitlement to Resort with Property-Right Protection. Granting
the entitlement to Resort with property-right protection will enable
Resort to capture value not only in scenarios R and FR but also in sce
nario F, in which Resort would shut down its activity. In this scenario,
in return for allowing Factory to operate, Resort would be able to ex
tract from Factory a payment equal to VR, the forgone value of Re
sort's activity, plus half of VF - VR, the surplus produced by the ex
change.31
Now consider Resort's inve.stment decision. As always, Resort will
bear the full cost · of each additional $1 investment in enhancing the
value of its activity. Resort will also benefit from the full value of mar
ginal increases in VR in scenarios R and FR, which have a combined
probability of 2/3. Furthermore, in scenario F, which has a probability
of 1/3, Resort will capture half of any marginal increase in the value of
VR.

It follows that Resort will have . an incentive to invest up to the
point where 5/6 (213 + {113 * 112]) of the marginal increase in the value
of VR produced by an additional $1 of investment falls to $1.32 By con
trast, the socially optimal level of investment for Resort is, as noted
above, at the point where 2/3 of the marginal increase in VR falls to $1.
It follows that the level of investment chosen by Resort will be socially
excessive.
Essentially, increases in the value of VR would provide Resort with
some private benefits that would not reflect a social gains but merely a
transfer of value from Factory. Because additional investment would
30. This means that the socially optimal investmen.t must satisfy 213 .* V,'(x) 1: More
generally, if P. and P,. denote the probabilities of scenarios R and FR respectively, then the
optimal investment will be defined by (P. + P,.) * V,'(x) 1 .
=

=

3 1 . The net value that Resort will obtain under the R P rule in scenario F thus equals
0.5(V. + V,). See supra Section IIl.C.
=

32. Formally, Resort's investment under the rule would satisfy {213 + (112 * 113)} * V,'(x)
1 . More generally, Resort's investment would satisfy [P. + P,. + (1 </!) * P,} * V,'(x) 1 .
-

=
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produce for Resort private benefits exceeding the produced social
gains, Resort will invest excessively under the RP rule.
b. Entitlement to Resort with Liability-Rule Protection. Under the
rule that gives the entitlement to Resort with liability-rule protection,
Resort will again obtain value not only in scenarios R and FR but also
in scenario F in which it would not operate. In scenario F, Resort
would shut down its activity but it would receive from Factory com
pensation for the value of its forgone activity VR'33 Thus, under the RL
rule Resort will capture the full value of marginal increases in VR in all
three scenarios.
Under the considered rule, then, Resort will capture the marginal
increase in the value of VR also in scenario F, in which the increase in
value of VR would produce no social value. Resort thus will elect to in
vest up to the point where the marginal increase in the value of VR
produced by an additional $1 of investment falls to $1.34 This level of
investment will exceed the socially optimal level.
Essentially, Resort's private gains from enhancing the value of VR
would exceed the social gains from such an increase. Furthermore, un
der the RL rule, Resort would capture the full value of any marginal
increase in the value VR, whereas under the RP rule Resort would cap
ture only a fraction of the increase in the value of VR'35 Hence, the RL
rule would distort Resort's incentives in the direction of excessive in
vestment even more severely than the RP rule would.
c. Entitlement to Factory with Property-Right Protection. Under the
FP rule Factory's property right will enable it to extract value from
Resort in scenario R. In th,is scenario, in which it would be efficient for
only Resort to operate, Factory would agree to shut down its activity
in exchange for compensation from Resort.36
'
33. By hypothesis, only Factory should operate in scenario F. Thus, under the RL rule,
the damages that Factory would pay to Resort in scenario F would equal v Resort would
receive this payment and willingly shut down. See also supra Section 111.B.
•.

34. Formally, Resort's investment under the rule would satisfy V/(x)

=

1.

35. Note that, whereas the total value with which Resort will end up under the RP rule
may exceed that under the RL rule, Resort's incentive to invest in enhancing the value of its
activity under the RL rule is stronger on the margin than under the RP rule. The reason for
this is similar to the one given earlier for why Factory's incentive to invest in enhancing the
value of its activity is higher under the FL rule than under the FP even though Factory's final
value is higher under the .latter rule. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
36. · Recall that the entitlement that Factory would enjoy represents the freedom to en
gage in its activity, i.e., to pollute the river. Consequently, Factory can transfer the entitle
ment and thereby extract value from Resort only if Factory completely shuts down its pol
luting activity. This can occur only in scenario R, in which Factory should shut down its
activity anyway. In scenario FR, Factory would not be willing to shut down its activity and
thus could not transfer its entitlement and extract value from Resort, whether under the FP
rule or the FL rule. By contrast, the entitlement that Resort would enjoy represents simply
the freedom from pollution, such that transfer of the entitlement would not require Resort to
shut down its activity but merely to suffer simultaneously the presence of pollution. Thus,
granting the entitlement to Resort with property-right protection would enable it to extract
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Furthermore, in the case in which pollution would be too costly for
Resort to bear and operate - that is, the case in which VR < H - the
amount that Factory will be able to extract depends on the value of Vw
In this case, under the assumption of equal bargaining power, Factory
will be able to capture in scenario R half of any marginal increase in
the value of Resort's activity.
Turning to Resort's private calculus as to how much to invest ex
ante, we start by noting that, in scenario FR, which has a probability of
112, Resort would capture fully any marginal increase in the value of
Vw In scenario R, however, which has a probability of 1/6, Resort
would capture only half of the marginal increase in the value of Vw
Thus, Resort will have an incentive to invest only up to the point
where 7/12 (that is, 112 + {116 * 112]) of the marginal increase in the
value of VR produced by an additional $1 investment falls to $1.37
It follows that Resort will set its level of investment below the
socially optimal level. The underlying intuition is that, under the FP
rule, Resort will bear the full cost of increasing xR, but will capture
only part of the resulting benefits. The remainder of the expected
benefits that Resort's investment will produce will go to Factory. For
this reason, Resort will have an insufficient incentive to invest at the
socially optimal level.
d. Entitlement to Factory with Liability-Rule Protection. Under the
FL rule, Resort will be required to pay damages to Factory in scenario
R, in which it would be efficient for Factory to shut down its activity.
Resort's payment in 'scenario R, however, would equal the forgone
value of Factory's activity and would not depend on the value of Re
sort's activity. Thus, Factory would not be able to extract from Resort
any portion of marginal increases in VR produced by Resort's ex ante
investment.
Turning to Resort's private calculus, note that Resort will capture
fully marginal increases in the value of VR in scenarios R and FR,
which have a combined probability of 2/3. Therefore, Resort will in
vest up to the point where 2/3 of the marginal increase in the value of
VR from an additional $1 of investment falls to $1.38 Thus, Resort will
invest as the socially optimal level.
The intuition underlying this conclusion is that although Factory
would be able to extract in scenario R some payment from Resort, this
value from Factory not only in scenario F, in which Resort would shut down, but also in sce
nario FR, in which Resort would continue to operate despite the pollution.
37. Formally, Resort's investment under the rule would satisfy 7112 * V/(x) = 1. More
generally, relaxing the assumption that v. < H, Resort's investment would satisfy [P,. + P. *
a * </>] * V/(x) = 1, where a denotes the probability that v. > H in the event that scenario R
takes place.
38. Formally, Resort's investment under the rule would satisfy 416 * V/(x) = 1, which is
the condition defining the socially optimal level of investment. See supra note 30.
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payment would not depend on the value of VR; since Resort wc;mld re
ceive in this scenario the excess of VR over the damages payments
made to Factory, Resort would fully capture marginal increases in VR
produced by its investment and thus would be the "residual claimant."
Because Resort would fully capture the expected social benefits from
its investment in enhancing the value of its activity, its private calculus
would align with that of social optimality.
e. Comparing the Rules. We can now put together our conclusions
concerning how alternative rules would affect Factory and Resort's in
vestments in enhancing the values of their respective activities. Table 5
summarizes these conclusions:
TABLE 5. VALUE-ENHANCING INVESTMENTS UNDER ALTERNATIVE
RULES
Resort's Investment

Factory's Investment
in Enhancing

Rule

in Enhancing

V,

VR

RP

Suboptimal

Excessive

RL

Optimal

Most Excessive

FP

Excessive

Suboptimal

FL

Most Excessive

Optimal

As Table 5 indicates, none of the four rules can induce the optimal
levels of both xF and xw Each of the two property-right rules, RP and
FP, would lead both parties to invest inefficiently, with the party re
ceiving the entitlement investing excessively and the other party in
vesting suboptimally. Each of the two liability rules, RL and FL,
would lead the party receiving the entitlement to invest optimally, but
the other party would invest excessively - and to a greater extent
than in the case in which the party receiving the entitlement was given
property-right protection.
·

D. Ex Ante Investments in Harm Reduction
1.

Socially Optimal Investment Levels

Having examined how alternative legal rules affect parties' invest
ments in enhan�ing the value of their respective activities, I now turn
to consider how these rules affect the parties' ex ante investments, Y R
and yF• in reducing the magnitude of the potential harm H in the event
of joint operation. From a social point of view, each party should
invest in harm reduction up to the point where the expected social
benefit from an additional $1 of such investment falls to $1.
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In determining marginal social benefit, we must take into account
that the potential harm would actually occur only in scenario FR,
which has a probability of 1/2. Thus, the expected social benefit from a
given reduction in H is equal to only half of this reduction. Thus, it
would be socially optimal for Factory to invest up to the point where
1/2 of the marginal reduction in H produced by an additional $1 of in
vestment by Factory is equal to $1.39 Similarly, from a social point of
view, Resort should invest up to the point where 1/2 of the marginal
reduction in H produced by an additional dollar of investment by Re
sort is equal to $1.40
2.

Investment Under Alternative Rules

a. Entitlement to Resort with Property-Right Protection. Let us start
with Factory's investment in harm reduction under the RP rule. Under
this rule, Factory will make a payment to Resort to get its permission
for Factory's activity only in scenario FR in which the harm would ac
tually occur. In this scenario, Factory will end up with a value of 0.5VF
- 0.5H.41 Thus, should scenario FR occur, Factory would capture half
of the savings from any marginal reduction in H.
Accordingly, when Factory decides how much to invest, it will rec
ognize that its expected benefit from increasing yF by $1 will equal 1/4
(112 * 112) of the reduction in the value of H produced by such a mar
ginal additional investment. Thus, Factory will invest up to the point
where 114 of the reduction in the value of H produced by an additional
$1 of investment falls to $1.
It follows that Factory's level of investment in harm reduction will
fall below the socially optimal level. The intuition behind this conclu
sion is that, although Factory will bear the full cost of any marginal in
crease in yF' it will share with Resort the expected benefits from such
investment, that is, the savings in scenario FR from a reduction in the
value of H. As a result, compared with what would be socially optimal,
Factory will invest too little.
For similar reasons, Resort will also invest suboptimally in harm
reduction under the RP rule. The harm will affect Resort also only in
scenario FR, and Resort would be able to capture in this scenario only
half of the benefits from any reduction in the value of H. Thus, Resort
will invest up to the point where 1/4 of the marginal reduction in H
39. Formally, Factory's optimal level of investment in harm reduction would be defined
by 112 * Hy/(y) -1. More generally, Factory's optimal level of investment in harm reduc
tion would satisfy: PF• * Hy/(y)
1
=

= -

.

40. Formally, Resort's optimal level of investment in harm reduction would satisfy: 112 *
Hy/(y) -1. More generally, Resort's optimal level of investment in harm reduction would
satisfy: PF• * Hy/(y) -1.
=

=

41. See supra Section III.A.
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produced by an additional $1 investment by Resort falls to $1. Thus,
because Resort will bear the full costs of increasing its investment in
harm reduction but will share the expected benefits of such reduction
with Factory, Resort will invest too little compared with what would
be socially optimal.
b. Entitlement to Resort with Liability-Rule Protection. Under the
RL rule, which gives Resort the entitlement with liability-rule protec"
tion, Factory will pay Resort damages in the amount of H in scenario
FR. Thus, in this scenario, which has a probability of 112, Factory
would capture all the benefits from any given reduction in the value of
H. Using reasoning similar to that used earlier, we can conclude that
Factory will invest up to the point where 112 of the reduction in H re
sulting from an additional $1 of investment by Factory is equal to $1.
It follows that Factory will invest optimally in harm reduction. Es
sentially, under the RL rule Factory will both bear the full social costs
of a marginal · increase in its investment level and capture the full
expected social benefits resulting from such investment.
In contrast, Resort's level of investment in harm reduction will be
zero. This inefficiency arises because in scenario FR, in which the
harm H would actually occur, Resort would receive full compensation
from Factory. Thus, Resort will not get any benefit from reductions iri
the value of H, and Resort thus will have no incentive to make any in
vestment to lowering the value of H.42
c. Entitlement to Factory with Property-Right Protection. Under the
FP rule, which gives the entitlement to Factory with property-right
protection, Factory will make no payments to Resort in scenario FR,
in which the harm H would actually materialize. Thus, Factory's pay
off in scenario FR will not depend on the value of H. Indeed, under
certain conditions, an increase in H would in fact benefit Factory by
increasing the amount that Factory would be able to extract from
Resort in scenario R.43
Factory thus would have no incentive to make any ex ante invest
ment in harm reduction, and will choose a zero level of investment,
which will clearly fall below the socially optimal level. The problem is
that, although Factory would bear the full cost of any investment it
would make in harm reduction, it would derive none of the social

42. This result is similar to the result in the economic analysis of torts showing that,
when courts make injurers strictly liable for victims' losses, injurers will invest optimally in
precautions and victims will make no investment in precautions. See, e.g. , STEVEN SHAVELL,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW, ch. 2 (1987).
43. Specifically, an increase in H will increase Factory's expected value in scenario R if
v. > H. In that situation, an increase in H would raise the damages to Resort from Factory's
pollution and thus would raise the surplus that would be generated (and partly captured by
Factory) from Factory's shutting down its activity.
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benefits produced by it and, indeed, might even suffer a loss from the
resulting decrease in H.
In contrast, Resort will invest excessively in harm reduction under
the FP rule. In scenario FR, Resort would obtain no payment from
Factory and would therefore bear the full cost of the harm.
Furthermore, in scenario R, in which Factory would agree to shut
down its activity and the potential harm would not materialize, a
smaller value of H would decrease the damages to Resort from pollu
tion and thereby improve Resort's bargaining position and decrease
the amount that Factory would be able to extract from Resort in re
turn for shutting down Factory's activity.44
In considering how much to invest, Resort would take into account
the benefit that it would obtain from a reduction in H both in scenario
FR, where Resort's private benefit would fully reflect social benefit,
and in scenario R, where Resort's private benefit would not reflect a
social benefit but rather a transfer from Factory. Thus, because Resort
will derive from its investment in harm reduction private benefits ex
ceeding the social benefits, Resort will invest excessively.
d. Entitlement to Factory with Liability-Rule Protection. Finally,
under the FL rule, which gives the entitlement to Factory but with the
protection of only a liability rule, Factory will in all three scenarios end
up with the full value of its activity, Vr Thus, Factory's final value will
in no way depend on the value of H. Therefore, Factory will derive no
benefit from any reduction in H, will have no incentive to make any
expenditures on harm reduction, and will make zero investment.
By contrast, Resort's investment in harm reduction will be set at
the socially optimal level. Under the FL rule, Resort will bear the full
harm, H, only in scenario FR, which occurs with a probability of 1/2. In
scenarios F and R, however, the value of H would have no effect on
the value that Resort would obtain. Resort therefore will invest up to
the point where 1/2 of the marginal reduction in H produced by an ad
ditional $1 of investment by Resort falls to $1. As we have seen earlier,
this level of investment will be socially optimal.
·e. Comparing the Rules. Putting together the conclusions from the
preceding subsections, Table 6 below summarizes our results con
cerning how the parties' investments in harm reduction under the four
different rules would compare with the socially optimal levels:

44. Stated differently, reducing the value of H might decrease the amount that Factory
would be able to extract in return for shutting down its activity in scenario R. Specifically, a
decrease in H would reduce the expected payment that Resort would make to Factory in
scenario R if v. > H. See supra Section 111.C.
·
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TABLE 6. INVESTMENTS IN HARM REDUCTION UNDER ALTERNATIVE
RULES
Factory's Investment

Resort's Investment

Rule

in Reducing H

in Reducing H

RP

Suboptimal

Suboptimal

RL

Optimal

Zero

FP

Zero

Excessive

FL

Zero

Optimal

As Table 6 indicates, none of the rules will generally ensure that
both Factory and Resort invest optimally in harm reduction. This state
of affairs arises because none of the rules will enable both parties to
capture the full social benefits produced by their respective invest
ments in harm reduction.
E.

Taking Stock

Having analyzed the effects of alternative rules both on parties' in
vestments in enhancing the value of their respective activities and on
parties' investments in harm reduction, we can now turn to an overall
comparison of ex ante investments under the four legal rules:
TABLE 7. OVERALL COMPARISON OF EX ANTE INVESTMENTS UNDER
ALTERNATIVE RULES
Factory's

Resort's

Factory's

Resort's

Investment

Investment

Investment in

Investment in

in VF

in VR

Reducing H

Reducing H

RP

Suboptimal

Excessive

Suboptimal

Suboptimal

RL

Optimal

Most Excessive

Optimal

Zero

Rule

FP

Excessive

Suboptimal

Zero

Excessive

FL

Most Excessive

Optimal

Zero

Optimal

As Table 7 indicates, none of the rules can ensure that both parties
will set both types of investments at the efficient level. Each rule will
lead at least two of the four ex ante investments to deviate from the
efficient level. Although each one of the rules involves some efficiency
costs, the rules might well differ considerably in how far investment
levels will fall short of efficiency. Therefore, the best rule from the
perspective of ex ante investments is the one that would produce the
lowest overall inefficiency costs.
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IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CHOICE OF RULE

Having identified and analyzed how legal rules can affect ex ante
actions and investments, I turn now to examine the implications of this
analysis for the choice of rule. Section A discusses the implications of
ex ante effects for the choice between property-right protection and
liability-rule protection. Section B considers the choice of which party
will be protected. Section C shows that, once we take ex ante consid
erations into account, it would be worthwhile to consider an expanded
menu of legal rules. Finally, Section D identifies a certain advantage
· that government fines and taxes have over private law rules in ad
dressing problems of ex ante incentives.
A

Property-Right Protection

vs.

Liability-Rule Protection

One important contribution of the existing literature has been to
identify certain important ex post advantages that liability rules enjoy
over property rights when ex post bargaining is not easy.45 As the dis
cussion below will explain, from the ex ante perspective, liability rules
are not generally superior. Liability rules sometimes do work better
than property rights, but sometimes they do not.
For concreteness, let us suppose that we have decided to protect
Resort against Factory's pollution, so that we now must decide only
whether to protect with a property right or with a liability rule - that
is, choose between RP and RL. The results displayed in Table 7
suggest that, from the perspective of ex ante investments, RL might or
might not work better than RP.
To understand the · balance of considerations, let us first examine
how these two rules affect Factory's ex ante investments. As Table 7
indicates, a liability rule (RL) would lead Factory to make more effi. cient investments than a property rule (RP) would.
Specifically, an RL rule would induce Factory to make both value
enhancement and harm-reduction investments at the socially optimal
level. In contrast, an RP rule would induce suboptimal levels of both
types of investment.
The RL rule, however, would produce inferior results with respect
to Resort's ex ante investments. Although both an RL and an RP rule
would lead Resort to invest excessively in value-enhancement, an RL
rule would induce greater over-investment than an RP rule. Further45. See Ayres & Talley, supra note 3; Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1; Kaplow &
Shavell, supra note 3. Kaplow and Shavell conclude that there is a prima facie case for fa
voring liability rules over property rights, id. at 721, but they list several factors (including
investments by victims in reducing potential harm) that might still make property rights de
sirable.

·
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more, although both rules would induce suboptimal investment in
harm-reduction by Resort, Resort would make no investment at all
under the RP rule but would make a positive investment under the RL
rule.
Thus, the RP rule would produce higher efficiency costs with re
spect to Factory's ex ante incentives, but the RL rule would produce
higher efficiency costs with respect to Resort's ex ante incentives.
Which rule would be better from an ex ante perspective will depend
on the overall balance of these efficiency costs. Policymakers wishing
to take ex ante efficiency into account should assess the relative mag�
nitude, in the considered context or category of cases, of the factors
identified above.
Thus, from the ex ante perspective, no general, one-size-fits-all
prescription exists. Different categories of cases might call for different
forms of protection. Below I offer several observations about circum
stances that would tend to make one form of protection superior to
the other.
First, when discouraging Factory from inefficient levels of invest
ment is regarded as much more important than discouraging Resort
from inefficient levels of investment, the RL rule will tend to be supe
rior to the RP rule. The intuition underlying this observation runs as
follows. The RL rule induces Factory to make optimal ex ante invest
ments both in enhancing the value of its activity and in reducing H. On
the other hand, Resort's deviations from optimality under the RL rule
are greater than those under the RP rule. Hence, if Factory's devia
tions have a sufficiently greater significance than Resort's deviations,
the RL rule will be superior.
We can make a similar observation about the case in which cur
tailing Resort's deviations from efficient investment levels is viewed as
much more important than reducing Factory's deviations. In this case,
the RP rule will tend to be superior to the RL rule.
Finally, the higher the likelihood that scenario F will materialize,
the more the RL rule will tend to be superior to the RP rule. In sce
nario F, in which only Factory will ultimately operate, Factory's ex
ante investment in enhancing the value of its operations activity is
valuable. In contrast, in this scenario, whatever investments were
made be Resort in enhancing the value of its activity or in reducing
harm would not produce any social benefit. Thus, the more likely sce
nario F, the more important it is to provide incentives for Factory's ex
ante investment in enhancing the value of its activity, and the less im
portant it is to provide incentives for Resort's ex ante incentives.

Ex Ante

December 2001)

B.

View of the Cathedral

635

Which Party Should Get the Entitlement?

We now turn to consider the entitlement allocation question:
Which party should get the entitlement to the river's water? Should
Factory have the right (whichever way it would be protected) to use
the water for its activity, or should Resort have the right (again,
whichever way it would be protected) to unpolluted water? For expo
sitional convenience,. I will assume that, whichever party is chosen to
get the entitlement, the party will be protected with a property right.
Accordingly, the choice to be considered is between FP and RP.
Again, the conclusions summarized in Table 7 indicate that neither
rule generally dominates the other in terms of ex ante incentives. ·Each
of them has some advantages and some. disadvantages when compared
to the other. Consider first how the two rules compare in their effect
on the parties' ex ante investments in enhancing the value of their re
spective activities. Neither rule generally induces optimal investment
by Factory in value enhancement. Whereas the RP rule will lead to
suboptimal investment, the FP rule will lead to an excessive invest
ment. Likewise, neither rule generally induces optimal investment by
Resort in value enhancement: in Resort's case, the FP rule leads to
suboptimal investment, whereas the RP rule leads to excessive invest
ment.
Consider next how these two rules compare in terms of their effect
on investment in harm reduction. The RP rule always performs better
than the FP rule with respect to Factory's investment: the FP rule will
lead Factory to make zero investment, whereas the RP rule will lead to
a positive (though still suboptimal) investment. With respect to Re
sort's investment in harm reduction, however, neither rule generally
dominates the other. The RP rule will lead Resort to make a subopti
mal investment, and the FP rule will lead to excessive investment.
From the perspective of ex ante efficiency, whether a property
right for Resort or a property right for Factory would be better de
pends on the various factors identified above. Again, the balance of
these considerations might vary from one category of cases to another.
It is worthwhile, however, to make some observations about circum
stances that would tend to make one of these rules superior to the
other.
When it is especially important to prevent Factory's investment in
value enhancement from falling below the efficient level, the ex ante
perspective will tend to favor a property right for Factory� The FP rule
leads Factory to invest excessively, whereas the RP rule leads to sub
optimal investment.
In contrast, when preventing Resort's investment from falling be
low the efficient level is relatively more important, the ex ante per
spective will tend to favor a property right for Resort. Whereas the FP
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rule will lead to suboptimal investment, the RP rule will lead to exces
sive investment.
As for investments in harm reduction, the more importance is at
tached to having Factory make at least some investment in harm re
duction, the more one would tend to favor the RP rule. Whereas the
FP rule leads to zero investment by Factory, the RP rule ensures posi
tive (though still suboptimal) investment.
In contrast, when Resort's investment in harm reduction is espe
cially important, the FP rule will tend to be superior. The RP rule will
lead Resort to make a suboptimal investment in harm reduction,
whereas the FP rule will lead to excessive investment.
C. . Should We Expand the Menu ofRules?
One important contribution of the Calabresi and Melamed article
comes from their classification of four basic alternative rules to deal
with the extemality problem. Subsequent literature followed this clas
sification for quite a while, with researchers focusing on these four
rules or on a subset of them. In the past several years, however, re
searchers have put forward additional creative rules, based on the pro
vision of put and call options, to address situations in which courts
cannot accurately observe parties' payoffs.46 As long as courts can be
assumed to know the parties' payoffs, however, researchers analyzing
liability rules have generally assumed that such rules should set liabil
ity at a level equal to the harm to one party from the other party's de
cisions and actions. Moreover, when courts are uncertain about the ac
curate level of harm, researchers have generally assumed that liability
rules would not set liability levels above or below the range of values
within which the damages might actually fall.
Once we recognize that the division of value matters in terms of ex
ante incentives, however, we can see that an expanded menu of legal
rules might be beneficial. In particular, it might be useful to use liabil
ity rules in which liability is intentionally set at a level that is known to
be higher or lower than actual damages harm.
Consider our comparison of how the RP and the RL rules divide
ex post value. In the event that Factory operates, the RL rule enables
Resort to receive an amount equal only to Resort's harm, whereas the
RP rule enables Resort to receive a part of Factory's surplus. As a re
sult, the RL rule performs better in terms of Factory's investments,
whereas the RP rule performs better in terms of Resort's investments.
These divisions of value produced by the RL and RP rules, how
ever, represent just two points along a c.ontinuum of possible ex post
divisions of value. Other points on this continuum, representing differ46. See supra note 1 1 and sources cited therein.
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ent .divisions of value, might produce a better mix of investments.
Thus, over- or undercompensatory damages, set above or below the
estimated harm, might sometimes lead overall to more desirable levels
of ex ante investments.
For example, when faced with a choice between RL and RP, we
might want to consider also a supercompensatory liability rule under
which, in the event that Factory pollutes, Factory would have to pay
Resort an amount equal, say, to 150% of its harm. Such an "interme
diate" rule might provide a better mix of ex ante incentives than either
one of RL or RP. Similarly, when we are trying to decide between RL
and no entitlement to Resort, we might want to consider also a partial
liability rule under which Resort would receive in the event that Fac
tory pollutes only, say, 50% of its actual damages.
To be sure, much work still remains before we can identify and
analyze the effects of such "intermediate" rules and determine the cir
cumstances under which they would be worthwhile. Once we recog
nize the influence of ex ante investments, however, we should also
recognize the value of exploring such an expansion of the menu from
which legal rules are selected.
D.

Taxes and Fines

The preceding analysis has shown that ·none of the considered al
ternative rules can attain the "first-best" outcome - that is, induce ef
ficient levels for all ex ante investments. Each rule produces some effi
ciency costs, with at least one of the parties not having ex ante optimal
incentives.47 Indeed, the logic of the analysis suggests that no ex post
allocation of entitlements - that is, no method for dividing the total
ex post value between the two parties - could fully eliminate all ex
ante inefficiencies. There appears to be no way to divide the ex post
value between the parties in such a way that both parties will at the
same time capture fully and exactly the social benefits that increases in
their ex ante investments generate.48
In theory, however, under some conditions, we could provide op
timal ex ante incentives to both parties through the imposition of gov
ernment fines. Suppose that, without needing Resort's help, the gov
ernment could ex post observe both whether Factory operates and
47. See Table 7, supra, for a summary of the effects of the four rules on ex ante invest
ments.
48. Problems of this type should be familiar to students of law and economics from other
contexts. For an excellent discussion, see Cooter, supra note 27. Although Cooter recognizes
that this problem arises in a number of contexts, he does not notice that, in the presence of
ex ante investments, it also arises in the context studied in this Article. Indeed, Cooter af
firmatively suggests that such a problem does not arise in the context of nuisance disputes
when courts use injunctive relief, i.e., property-right protection. See id. at 27-28.
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what level of damages Resort suffers from Factory's pollution. And
consider a Government-Fine rule under which, if Factory operates, it
must pay the government a fine equal to the social cost of Factory's ac
tivity, which is the damages from pollution to Resort. These damages,
recall, will equal H when VR exceeds H, but will equal VR when H ex
ceeds VR and Resort therefore can minimize its damages by shutting
down.
Under such a Government-Fine rule, each party will internalize all
of the effects of its ex ante investments. As a consequence, ex ante
both parties will make socially optimal investments both in enhancing
the value of their own respective activities and in reducing potential
harm. Essentially, the Government-Fine rule combines the efficiency
advantages of both the RL and the FL rule with respect to the invest
ments of both parties.
To start, the Government-Fine rule leaves Factory in the position
of the "residual claimant" on its value-enhancing investment. Factory
will thus capture fully the marginal social benefits from such invest
ment. Furthermore, because the Government-Fine rule requires Fac
tory to pay in the event that it pollutes neither more nor less than the
damages caused to Resort from pollution, Factory will invest optimally
in harm reduction. Essentially, because Factory would face the same
incentives under the Government-Fine rule as under the RL rule, Fac
tory will face optimal ex ante incentives under the former as it does
under the latter.49
Furthermore, whereas the RL rule would not induce optimal in
vestments on the part of Resort, the Government-Fine rule would.
With respect to Resort's investments, the Government-Fine rule
would produce the same effects as the FL rule. Recall that the FL rule
leads Resort to make efficient ex ante investments because it makes
Resort the "residual claimant" on its investments both in harm reduc
tion and value enhancement.50
The reason as to why the Government-Fine rule can combine the
good effects of both the RL and FL rules is that, unlike the RL and FL
rules, the Government-Fine rule is not limited to dividing the total ex
post value between the two parties. Instead, by introducing the gov
ernment as a third party, the Government-Fine rule makes Factory
and Resort each bear the full social cost produced by the externality,
which in turn provides both parties with optimal ex ante incentives.

49. See supra Section IV.B(2)(ii) (discussing Factory's investment in enhancing its value
under the RL rule); see also supra Section IV.D(2)(ii) (discussing Factory's investment in
harm reduction under the RL rule).
50. See supra Section IV.C.(2)(iv) (discussing Resort's investment in enhancing its value
under the FL rule); see also supra Section IV.D(2)(iv) (discussing Resort's investment in
harm reduction under the FL rule).
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Although the law does sometimes use fines or taxes, the Govern
ment-Fine rule is far from being generally used. The limited use of
fines or taxes might be due to the fact that the assumptions in the
above analysis often do not hold. First, a Government-Fine rule might
not be triggered whenever Factory pollutes; why would Resort report
Factory's pollution when Resort cannot expect any compensation?51
Furthermore, even if pollution by Factory could be observed by the
government, Resort would have no incentive to assist the government
in assessing the damages suffered by Resort. Indeed, Resort might
agree to help Factory, in return for a side payment, by doing whatever
possible to lower the estimate of harm.52 These two problems might
well place limits on our ability to take advantage of the potential bene
fits of government fines.
VI.

CONCLUSION

One of the basic questions confronting the law is how to allocate
entitlements in the presence of externalities. This Article has focused
on the effects that such allocations have on ex ante investments and
actions. Once we take ex ante effects into account, the ex post alloca
tion of entitlements, and the distributive effects it produces, might well
be important even when parties can easily bargain ex post. By identi
fying the various ex ante effects of alternative rules, this Article has
sought to provide a framework for assessing such effects. Such assess
ment should be an important element in the design of property rights
and liability rules.

5 1 . The importance of private reporting often comes up as one of the relevant consid
erations in choosing between private and public enforcement of law. See, e.g. , Steven Shaven,
The Optimal Structure of Law Enforcement, 36 J.L. & ECON. 255, 267 (1993).
At first glance, the problem might be solved by providing Resort with a financial reward
for accurately reporting the magnitude of harm. As Shaven pointed out, however, when Fac
tory's fine exceeds Resort's financial reward, Factory might induce Resort not to report by
offering a side payment intermediate between the fine to Factory and Resort's financial re
ward for reporting.

